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policy issue Australia has recently implemented an activity-based funding system for public 
hospitals. Policymakers and providers are keen to ensure that the price paid for 
health care services stimulates improvements in quality and safety, but some remain 
sceptical that this can be achieved through pricing mechanisms. 
There are four main ways of linking quality and safety to hospital pricing in the 
context of activity based funding:  
 
 Best-practice pricing  
 This involves making evidenced-based decisions on what constitutes 
‘best-practice’ for the treatment of a particular condition, then 
paying health services a set price when they provide best-practice 
care. 
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 Normative pricing 
 This involves using price to influence the delivery of care (for 
example, providing incentives to deliver more care in the home for 
certain conditions or to provide day surgery options where 
appropriate). 
 Structural models of pricing quality 
 This involves linking funding to meeting accreditation standards or 
participating in benchmarking activities or clinical quality registries.  
 Payment for Performance (P4P) or quality pricing 
 This involves using financial incentives and/or disincentives to 
encourage providers to behave in certain ways that will improve 
quality and safety. 
 
This paper briefly examines the strength of the evidence for each of these pricing 
models. It considers both peer-reviewed research as well as non peer-reviewed 
material, such as program evaluations and government reports.  
  
what does the 
evidence say? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a rich literature arguing that health care pricing models should reward 
quality and safety. Many of the arguments are inherently appealing. However while 
strong on argument, overall the literature is weak on evidence. 
Best-practice pricing  
 
Very little peer-review research has examined whether best-practice pricing models 
stimulate improvements in quality and safety, but there are some studies that 
provide useful information. One study was conducted in Michigan through a 
Participating Hospitals Agreement with Blue Shield Blue Cross.[1] In this study, 
researchers examined how closely clinicians adhered to best-practice guidelines for 
the treatment of acute myocardial infarction and congestive heart failure when 
guidelines were tied to an incentive tariff. They found that that over a three year 
period (from 2000 to 2003), the rate of appropriate aspirin use increased by 8 per 
cent, beta-blockers by 12 per cent and ACE inhibitors by 10 per cent. Overall, the 
researchers estimated that more than 24,000 patients received better care during 
this period because of the incentive program.  
 
While the incentive program improved compliance with best-practice guidelines, it 
came at a cost of more than US$22 million (including administration costs). Because 
there was no adequate baseline data prior to implementation, and no control group 
or data from hospitals that did not participate in the program, it is impossible to tell 
how effective the incentives really were. Likewise, it is impossible to tell whether the 
high cost of the program was worthwhile. Some researchers have also criticised the 
study, suggesting that estimations of the effectiveness of the program were 
overstated.[2]  
 
Several other small studies on best-practice pricing incentives have also been 
undertaken: one in the US and one in Taiwan. The US study looked at improvements 
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what does the 
evidence say? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in adherence to best-practice guidelines for coronary artery bypass graft surgery, 
and the Taiwanese one looked at management of breast cancer patients.[3,4] Both 
studies reported that best-practice pricing led to modest improvements in the 
quality of care provided. However both of the studies also had serious 
methodological flaws (for example, no control group or poor descriptions of the 
program), which means the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive.   
 
Because there is little peer-reviewed research evidence in this field, the next best 
alternative source of evidence comes from evaluating best-practice pricing 
initiatives operating in the field. Currently, the English Best Practice Price Tariffs 
(BPPT) scheme is the largest best-practice pricing initiative in operation.[5] The 
program applies to the treatment of a range of conditions, including 
cholecystectomy (gall bladder removal), the management of fragility hip fractures, 
cataract surgery and stroke management. A formal evaluation of the scheme itself 
has not yet been published, although a review of the related Payments by Results 
(or pay for performance) program is available.[6] Initial findings suggest that this 
program has led to substantial improvements in some (but not all) quality indicators 
for some conditions (hip fractures, for example).[7]  
 
Normative pricing  
 
Just as with best-practice pricing models, there has been very little peer-review 
research done on normative pricing schemes and their impact on quality and safety. 
Under these schemes, incentives are provided to encourage certain desired 
outcomes, for example more day surgery, reduced readmissions, shorter patient 
processing times or more home based care.  
 
Some research on the impact of normative pricing has been done in the radiology 
field. It shows substantial improvements in radiology reporting times following the 
introduction of normative pricing.[8,9] Due to weaknesses in the research design – 
for example, there was no concurrent control group – it is impossible to draw strong 
conclusions from these studies.  
  
Normative pricing schemes have been, or are currently being, introduced in a 
number of countries (e.g. UK, USA, Australia, Canada), but evaluation data for the 
major initiatives are not yet available. Once evaluations are complete they are likely 
to generate valuable evidence on the effectiveness of normative pricing models.  
 
Structural models of pricing quality  
 
The main structural approaches to improving quality of care are to link funding to 
participation in accreditation programs or benchmarking activities. Without strong 
evidence available, the most promising approach appears to be to provide funding 
to help clinical services participate in clinical quality registries, and to undertake 
clinical benchmarking (or casemix adjusted) comparisons with other similar services. 
The evidence on clinical benchmarking is strong in terms of achieving improvements 
in quality and safety.[10-12] However, as yet there is no research that examines the 
impact of clinical benchmarking in combination with incentive or structural funding.  
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what does the 
evidence say? 
Pay for performance models  
 
In Pay for Performance (P4P), or what are sometimes called ‘quality pricing models’, 
financial incentives are paid to providers who achieve a high level of performance on 
specified indicators. For example in the US, if hospitals performed in the top 10 per 
cent for a certain clinical measure, a bonus payment equivalent to 2 per cent of 
annual diagnosis-related group payment was paid.   
 
There has been considerable research done on the effectiveness of pay-for-
performance schemes in improving quality and safety, much of it coming from the 
US.[13,14] Numerous research studies have examined the Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration (PHQID), one of the first and leading initiatives in the US. 
Overall, there is no convincing evidence that improvements in outcomes can be 
attributed to P4P programs.[13,14] Findings from many of the studies are limited 
because of issues with generalisation; participation in the P4P scheme was 
voluntary, for example, which means the hospitals participating in the program may 
not be representative of hospitals more generally. Findings are also limited because 
the incentives often applied to the treatment of only a few conditions. It is also 
difficult to demonstrate that the scheme was effective because the Centre for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services implemented a public reporting program at the 
same time, making it difficult to isolate the individual effect of the P4P incentives.  
 
The most definitive evidence on the effectiveness of the PHQID P4P scheme in the 
US comes from a recent study published in the New England Journal of 
Medicine.[13] It found that there was no difference in patient outcomes when 
hospitals in the Premier pay-for-performance program were compared with non-
Premier hospitals. Importantly, no difference was found in outcomes even for 
conditions where incentives were explicitly provided to reduce mortality rates.   
 
In England, the Advancing Quality (AQ) initiative implemented in 2008 was modelled 
on the PHQID program, but the price incentives were considerably larger, and 
applied to the top 25 per cent (versus the top 10 per cent) of hospitals. In the AQ 
program, participation was mandatory for all hospitals in the North-West England 
region, and efforts were made to ensure incentive payments were received by the 
actual clinical areas involved in the program.   
 
Study results show that the introduction of the AQ initiative in 132 hospitals had an 
impact on short-term in-hospital mortality rates. It led to a 1.3 per cent drop in the 
overall 30 day in-hospital mortality rate for the three conditions examined 
(pneumonia, heart failure, acute myocardial infarction), although only the reduction 
in mortality rate for pneumonia (1.8 per cent) was significant.[15,16] Despite these 
positive findings, researchers found that these observed improvements did not lead 
to improvements in the composite quality scores for participating hospitals, and this 
raises some doubts about the interpretation of results.  
 
The use of financial disincentives or penalties to drive quality improvement appears 
to be gaining momentum both domestically and internationally. In these models, it 
is common to withhold payment for ‘never events’  or when patients end up with 
hospital acquired infections.[5,17] Because these models are only relatively new, 
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there is currently no evidence demonstrating how effective they are in improving 
quality and safety.   
 
What works best? 
 
When taken as a whole, the evidence provides some guidance on the factors that 
are likely to make a pricing model effective. They are:  
 
 Incentives need to be substantial if the model is to have any effect [13] 
 Incentives need to be delivered to the level of the clinical department to 
have any effect [13-16,18,19] 
 The impact of any proposed model needs to be modelled and carefully 
evaluated both prior to implementation and at regular intervals 
afterwards  
 Any analysis of the impact of a new pricing model should consider the 
possibility that regional disparities will arise; there is some evidence that 
some pay for performance models have disadvantaged rural hospitals 
[19] 
 Incentive structures need to focus on engendering improvement across 
all hospitals rather than just rewarding hospitals or services that are 
already performing well [14,20-23] 
 Potential perverse incentives need to be carefully considered, and 
[18,24]  
 Methodologies for risk adjustment need to be developed and 
incorporated.[10,14,22,24]  
  
what is the  
quality of the 
evidence available? 
 
In this field, much of the current research suffers from a variety of methodological 
flaws, making the evidence base relatively weak. Many studies, for example, do not 
have adequate control groups, making it difficult to make strong claims about the 
impact of pricing models. For some initiatives, the only evidence available comes 
from program evaluations published in government reports or grey literature, and 
this evidence also suffers from similar methodological weaknesses.[2,25] 
 
Evaluations of pricing initiatives to improve quality need to be carefully designed 
with appropriate controls and baseline data. They need to commence at the start of 
any field trial rather than at some period after initial implementation. When post 
hoc analyses or evaluations are done, often the relevant data has not been 
gathered, making it impossible to measure the impact of the scheme. 
 
A number of key evaluation reports for some of the British Schemes (AQ, BPPT, and 
the Commissioning for Quality and Innovation Payment Framework) are unavailable 
as yet, making it impossible to critically evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes. 
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what does this  
mean for  
policymakers? 
Overall, there is insufficient international evidence at present to support the 
adoption of any ‘off the shelf’ pricing model designed to improve the quality and 
safety of health care.   
Some models show promise and these could be trialled in the Australian context. 
However it is vital that rigorous evaluations are designed and implemented as the 
program is rolled out.  
The existing evidence, while limited, does have some implications for the new 
hospital pricing system currently being implemented in Australia. Under the new 
pricing model, the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority (IHPA) determines the 
price that the Australian Government pays as its contribution to public hospital 
funding. The Australian Government contribution is approximately 40 per cent of 
public hospital funding and any incentive that the IHPA might build into the model 
would impact only on the Commonwealth contribution. Further, the Australian 
Government funding is not directed to specific hospitals or to clinical departments 
within hospitals. Based on the evidence in the international literature, it is unlikely 
that incentives built into the model at this level would work unless there was 
agreement that these incentives would flow down to the level of the clinical 
department. 
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